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At the time of writing, more than 5.2 million persons have been infected by Covid-19, leading 
to 340,000 deaths, while about 2.2 million people have recovered (WHO 2020). South Africa 
has reported 23,000 infections and 481 deaths (DoH 2020). On 27 March 2020, South Africa 
declared a national state of disaster and effected a national lockdown. This greatly affected 
the provision of services across the entire country, save for the provision of essential services.
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While South Africa should be commended for the use 
of a tiered system of five levels for easing restrictions 
during the lockdown, a certain category of people 
remain substantively affected in the enjoyment of their 
rights. The child holds a special place in the human 
rights discourse as he or she is a rights-holder in his or 
her own right. This was reiterated by the Supreme Court 
in S v M, where it stated that the child is not a mere 
extension of his or her parents but a person with rights 
that can be enforced in courts of law. It is important to 
take cognizance of this position at a time when rights 
have been significantly restricted to mitigate the spread 
of Covid-19.
The Constitution of South Africa provides for the 
limitation of rights where it is reasonable in a free and 
democratic society. Before the lockdown, however, the 
courts have, in cases such as S v Manamela and Another 
(Director-General of Justice Intervening) (Manamela), 
hastened to find that even if a limitation to a right is 
rationally connected to the purpose of fighting crime, 
it may not be recognised if it is not the least restrictive 
means of achieving that purpose. This position seems to 
have changed, as highly restrictive measures have been 
adopted to mitigate the spread of the coronavirus. For 
instance, in the Exparte application of Karel Willem Van 
Heerden, the Mpumalanga High Court had to decide on 
the possibility of exempting a private individual from 
the lockdown restriction to go and bury his father. The 
Court dismissed the application because allowing the 
application amounted to breaking a decree. It stated, 
in addition, that despite the care and diligence of the 
applicant, he would still expose himself to unnecessary 
risk and possible death. Other applications, such 
as Hola Bon Renaissance (HBR), were struck out by 
the Court because they did not have any prospect of 
success. In the case of Muhammed Mohammed and 
others v The President of South Africa and others, the 
court held that the limitations on rights imposed by the 
Regulations are reasonable and justifiable under the 
Constitution. 
In all these cases, the position of children was not at 
issue. In the subsequent case of CD and MD, the court 
allowed the applicant to travel from Cape Town to 
Bloemfontein and back to collect his or her children 
from the grandparents. While the reasoning that 
informed this position is important, other intricate 
dimensions that create inclusion and exclusion criteria 
are instructive to look at as well.
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Concerning possible benefits to children, two points 
were established by the amended directions. First, 
in the narrow perspective, the amended directions 
either included or excluded children who were 
subject to co-parenting arrangements depending 
on their possession of either a court order or the 
parenting agreement or plan. Secondly, and in a wide 
perspective, all children whose parents or caregivers 
did not need a court order or a parenting plan before 
the lockdown were automatically excluded. 
Two pertinent questions arise from the amended 
regulations. The first is whether the court order 
and the agreements have to be in existence before 
one invokes the application of Direction 1(c). The 
second is whether the courts would deal with the 
narrow and wide forms of inclusion and exclusion. 
Before considering these questions, this article 
contextualises the case of CD and MD.
 
Contextualising CD and MD 
This article focuses on the decision in CD and MD in 
particular because, as of 27 May 2020, it was the only 
case so far that has been decided that deals with the 
rights of children who are staying with caregivers. 
This section unpacks the facts and judgment as well 
as the latter’s implications.
Child protection in the 
Regulations
 
Following the executive’s decision to adopt a lockdown 
to mitigate the spread of Covid-19, regulations were 
adopted to be enforced. These were provided for the 
Disaster Management Act Regulations (Regulations), 
published in Government Gazette No. 43199. They were 
passed by the Minister of Cooperative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs under section 27(2) of the Disaster 
Management Act 57 of 2002 (DMA 2002). To this end, 
Regulations 3(b)(i) and (iii) prohibit the movement of 
persons and goods between provinces and between 
metropolitan and district areas. The Regulations state 
that ‘every person is confined to his or her place of 
residence’ unless he or she is performing an essential 
service, attending a funeral or collecting a social grant. 
It was evident that this regulation excluded any 
sort of protection to children who were not staying 
with both or one of their parents or caregivers. This 
regulation excluded any sort of protection to children 
who were not staying with both or one of their parents 
or caregivers. This exclusion extended where children 
were with a different person (where movement was 
necessary) other than their caregiver or parent at the 
time the Regulations came into force.
This position changed with the amended directions 
to the Regulations that came into force on 7 April 
2020. According to the amended directions, Direction 
1(c) allows for the movement of children between co-
holders of parental responsibilities. The co-holders of 
parental responsibilities should have either 1) a court 
order or 2) a parental responsibilities or parenting 
plan, registered with the family advocate. These 
documents have to be certified and in the physical 
possession of the co-caregiver. This is an indication 
that for children to be moved between co-holders of 
parental responsibilities, the latter have to have a 
court order or a parental responsibilities and rights 
agreement/parenting plan. In addition, the document 
has to be certified. As such, the physical possession 
of any of these duly certified documents remains a 
condition precedent to the movement of a person 
(Directions 2020). 
… this regulation 
excluded any sort 
of protection to 
children who were 
not staying with 
both or one of 
their parents or 
caregivers
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Facts and judgment 
On 6 April 2020, the applicants applied under the 
Regulations to dispense with the restrictions on the 
movement of persons to enable them to travel from 
Cape Town to Bloemfontein and back to collect their 
children from the grandparents. The children had 
travelled to visit the grandparents for the school 
holidays, but could not move from Bloemfontein 
due to the lockdown. At the time of applying, the 
regulations of 30 March 2020 were in force. The 
amended directions were released only a day later. 
It is for this reason that the respondent objected to 
the application on the grounds that the regulations 
did not provide for the movement of children 
between caregivers. The facts are silent on whether 
the application was amended before the judge 
handed down the decision. Furthermore, while the 
amended directions provided for the existence of 
either a court order or parenting agreements, they 
are silent on whether the latter had to pre-exist 
them (the amended directions). 
The most pertinent fact was that the application 
was filed a day before the new regulations came into 
force on 7 April 2020. The key issue identified by the 
Court was whether the applicants would be allowed 
to travel to Bloemfontein to collect their children, 
and if so whether the Court would dispense with 
the regulations in force on 30 March or subject the 
application to the amended directions of 7 April 
2020.
The Court held that there was no prohibition on 
the movement of the children because their 
circumstances were within the exception of 
amended Direction 1(c). According to the Court, 
the order from an earlier decree of divorce had 
arrangements in place for the movement of the 
children between the applicants. On this basis, 
the applicants were given an order to travel from 
Cape Town to Bloemfontein to fetch their children. 
In regard to the silence of the amended directions 
on the pre-existence of an order or parenting plan, 
the Court added insight to a limited extent. It stated 
that a court order need not be in existence at the 
time of the lockdown. As a result, co-caregivers are 
at liberty to apply for the requisite order to legalise 
their movements.
The Court also stated that the children would only be 
allowed to travel from the first applicant’s address 
to the second when the latter was confirmed to 
have tested negative for the Covid-19 virus. It added 
that it was common cause that the grandparents 
were caregivers, as defined in section (1)(i) of the 
Children’s Act, as they cared for the children with 
the express permission of the parents. While the 
movement of the children between their caregiver 
grandparents and parents was prohibited, a court 
order or parenting plan was instructive. Once the 
requisite document was concluded, the movement 
of children would be legalised.
Implications of the judgment 
 
First, the use of section 36 of the Constitution has 
been limited to instances where the applicants want 
the court to find that the restrictions are irrational 
and not proportional to the purpose they seek to 
serve. As indicated by Van Heerden and Hola Bola 
Renaissance, this approach has not yielded results. 
However, where one seeks to satisfy the inclusion 
criteria in the amended directives, the court may be 
indulged. 
It should be recalled that while the application 
was brought under the March regulations, the 
Court decided the matter using the April amended 
directions. If the Court were to use the March 
Regulations, it would have to subject the measures 
by the government to the limitation clause in 
section 36 of the Constitution. This would entail 
an evaluation of the nature of the restrictions 
and the state’s rationality in using them. There is 
no doubt that this would entail the application of 
the principles in the earlier case of Home Affairs 
v NICRO. 
For instance, in the latter, the Court was tasked 
to establish whether the changes to the Electoral 
Act curtailed the constitutional right of prisoners 
to vote, and if so, whether this limitation was not 
justified by section 36 of the Constitution. While this 
12 ESR REVIEW  #03 | Vol. 21 | 2020
case did not deal with the Covid-19 pandemic, it 
questioned the application of the limitation clause. 
This would strike a balance between ensuring or 
disregarding public health initiatives to meet the 
various needs of the South Africa population. 
The Court called for a subjective evaluation of 
facts that could not be readily proved objectively. 
It restrained itself from engaging a fact-finding 
mission that was not supported by evidence. In 
CD and MD, the Court diverted from this approach 
although the application was filed under the March 
Regulations.
Secondly, it can be inferred from the language of 
the Court that it opted to evaluate the subjective 
facts before it against the objective principles of the 
law. It weighed an exercise of discretion to either 
allow or deny the orders sought by an applicant, 
based on various reasons. In this case, the Court 
evaluated the best interests of the children in the 
circumstances. The factual finding that the co-
caregivers had other underlying medical conditions 
and were strained informed the grant of the order 
to travel. One may question why the Court used a 
law that was not in existence at the time the facts 
unfolded. This can be inferred from the Court’s 
reliance on the best interests of the children in the 
subsequent paragraph.
Thirdly, the best-interests principle plays a crucial 
role in matters concerning children (Tostensen et 
al. 2011). It should be noted that the Court used 
the best-interests principle as a ‘gap-filling’ tool in 
ensuring the wellbeing of the children (Tostensen 
et al. 2011). This principle may be used to resolve 
conflicts and the competing rights of children, and 
it enables courts to balance legal technicalities and 
arrive at a good decision for a child (Alston 1994). 
With this principle in mind, the decision in CD and 
MD casts light on the exclusion/inclusion procedure. 
It should be recalled that, first, in the short run, an 
excluded co-caregiver had an opportunity to obtain 
an order to move and help a child. This is in line 
with the Committee on the Rights of the Child’s 
General Comment 14 that recognises the application 
of the best interests’ principle in informing the 
enjoyment of a substantive right, interpreting legal 
principles and rules of procedure (CRC, 2013). It 
should also be noted that section 28 of the South 
African Constitution states that the best interests 
of the child should be of paramount importance 
in every matter concerning him or her. The use of 
this principle enabled the possible engagement 
of excluded caregivers in the narrow and wide 
perspective. However, the Court’s silence on the 
conclusion of parental plans leaves a question as 
to whether they can be made and registered to 
legalise movements.
Fourthly, a look at the applicant’s use of digital 
means to satisfy the Court as to the merits of the 
application shows that the Court can operate in 
the digital age. As such, the modes of operation of 
court processes need to be addressed. The case 
shows that counsel for the applicants satisfied 
the Court that the caregivers were not suited to 
continuing to look after the children due to their 
pre-existing conditions. Also, the record showed 
that Counsel for the Applicants used video-
conferencing to ensure that the co-caregivers were 
heard through online video systems. This represents 
the new normal in conducting business in courts. 
Conversations with attorneys indicate that courts 
are embracing the use of CCTV and other online 
platforms to hear applications and urgent matters. 
If the Court were 
to use the March 
Regulations, 
it would have 
to subject the 
measures by the 
government to the 
limitation clause 
in section 36 of the 
Constitution
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Two questions were raised above – first, in regard to 
whether the court order and the agreements have to 
be in existence before one invokes the application 
of direction 1(c), and, secondly, in regard to how the 
Court would deal with the different inclusive and 
exclusion criteria at both the narrow and wider level. 
According to the Court, an order need not pre-exist 
the regulations or amended directions. The effect of 
this flexibility in the possible application for the order 
by co-caregivers helps to narrow the gap between 
excluded and included children. The Court’s decision 
was silent on the pre-existence of parenting plans 
duly registered with a family law advocate. This calls 
for an academic debate on whether a family advocate 
may conclude this agreement.
An evaluation of the decision shows that the effect 
of the lockdown regulations on children requires that 
the applicant has a court order or a parenting plan. 
The other children who do not benefit include those 
with no existing family plans. The dangers of Covid-19 
need to be balanced against the best interests of 
vulnerable children. 
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